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Last December saw the culmination in the Maastricht Summit of the Intergovernmental 
Conferences (IGC) on Economic and Monetary Union and Political Union, which began in 
Rome at the end of 1990. The negotiations resulted in the adoption of a Treaty on European 
Union. This article gives a short overview of the Member States response to the major 
questions dominating the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: the problem of 
democratic deficit, the question of more efficient decision-making, the question of more 
effective implementation, and the need to increase the Community's capacity to act 
internationally.
1. The Democratic Deficit
One of the most important challenges of the IGC was to reduce the democratic deficit in the 
Community. One way to do this was seen to be to increase the role of the European Parliament 
in the decision-making process of the Community and to give it more powers of supervision. 
The cooperation procedure introduced by the Single European Act (SEA) took a step in this 
direction. The new Article 189b of the Maastricht Treaty, known as co-decision, (although that 
term is not used in the Treaty) takes matters one step further. In cases of disagreement with the 
Council, and unsuccessful efforts to find an agreement through a Conciliation Committee, the 
European Parliament will have a final veto.
The introduction of Union citizenship should also enhance the 'sense of community' and 
contribute to political democracy, as commonly understood.
A further issue is the Parliament's involvement in the appointment of the Commission. The 
Maastricht Treaty codifies the practice of parliamentary consultation on the nomination of the 
President of the Commission. This nominated President will then be consulted by the member 
governments concerning the other members of the Commission. 'The President and the other 
members of the Commission thus nominated shall be subject as a body to a vote of approval 
by the European Parliament' (Article 158(2)). It was also decided that from 1 January 1995 the 
Commission's term of office shall be five years, instead of the present four; the Commission's 
term of office will then correspond to that of the Parliament.
A final point that should be mentioned is that while the Parliament still does not have the right 
of legislative initiative, it will be able to request the Commission 'to submit any appropriate 
proposal on matters on which it considers that a Community act is required' (Article 137a).
To summarize, although the Parliament's powers have been increased through the Maastricht 
Treaty, it does not yet fully possess the powers that most national parliaments have.
2. Efficiency in Decision-Making
Another yardstick that can be applied to the Maastricht Treaty is whether it will increase the 
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1EC's problem solving capacity. Although this is an issue that goes beyond formal institutional 
arrangements, an important institutional question is: to what extent will unanimity still be 
required in the Council?
We can say that the Maastricht Treaty retains unanimity for a number of decisions in areas 
considered sensitive, such as industrial policy and culture. These areas, however, have been 
limited, and a deliberate effort was made to open more doors to qualified majority decisions.
3. More Effective Implementation
Administrative implications of the EC's new competences and the new provisions on CFSP, 
justice and home affairs are only dealt with in a marginal way by the Treaty. To the extent that 
the Community also has a 'management deficit', it can be argued that the Maastricht Treaty did 
not contribute much improvement on these points.
As regards the failure of Member States to fulfil obligations under the Treaty, including the 
implementation of directives, the Maastricht Treaty includes a novelty. The Court of Justice 
will, in the future, be able to impose 'a lump sum or penalty payment' on a defaulting state 
(Article 171(2)). Such a sanction may help, but the problem of administrative capacity at both 
Commission and Member State levels remains.
4. Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy
If one agrees that the Community - or new Union - should have a capacity in the foreign policy 
area commensurate with its economic power, then the CFSP is one of the more disappointing 
aspects of the Maastricht Treaty. In the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
the general decision rule will remain unanimity or consensus. The provisions make a 
distinction between cooperation and joint action. Joint action will be in areas where Member 
States have 'essential interests in common.' It is up to the Council to decide, 'on the basis of 
general guidelines from the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint 
action (Article C).' It is also the Council who will decide, when implementing the joint action, 
which decisions will be taken by qualified majority. This concerns a special kind of qualified 
majority, requiring at least 54 votes in favour, cast by at least eight members. How this will 
work out in the future is difficult to predict, but most likely there will not be much teeth in the 
CFSP.
This brief overview of the results achieved in Maastricht has been inspired by a belief that the 
Community should move towards a democratic and efficient set-up, where common problems 
can be solved in a positive and equitable manner. We believe that the Maastricht Treaty 
constitutes a further step in that direction. The new powers of co-decision for the European 
Parliament are important. We also see expanded policy scope for the Community in the future. 
But one could have wished for a single structure of the new Treaty as advocated by the 
Commission and proposed by the Dutch Presidency. We believe that the intergovernmental 
structures of the CFSP and for cooperation on justice and home affairs will produce too many 
disappointments. Classic intergovernmentalism is a prescription for suboptimal decisions. 
Hopefully, if this turns out to be the case, the integration process can be taken a few steps 
further at the next IGC in 1996. We fear that otherwise the Community will not be 
institutionally equipped to accommodate new members as diverse as Sweden and Poland, not 
to mention Estonia or Turkey. There can be no doubt that there will be political pressures to 
accept many new members over the next decade and it is important that the acquis
communautaire be deepened as much as possible before that happens, otherwise the risks of 
disintegration will increase.
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